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1 Introduction
Albania is slowly recovering from the trauma of
breakdown in civil order which occurred in March
1997 following the collapse of pyramid saving
schemes. Until then, Albania had seemed a flour-
ishing example of how economic growth could
take off in a newly developing market economy
However, with the collapse of pyramid savings
schemes and the resulting breakdown of social
order, the weakness of the economic transition
framework was exposed.
Albania historical development prior to the col-
lapse of a rigid communist regime in 1990-91 had
been authoritarian and largely autarkic. Unlike
Poland or the Czech Republic, there had been no
experience of a European model of liberal democ-
racy with modern democratic institutions. Instead,
the relationship between the state and society had
been characterised by autocratic rulers, the
Ottomans and the communists, where freedom to
evolve democratic institutions through the devel-
opment of civil society did not exist. Social rela-
tions, then and now, have been based on family
and clan. Revenge killings operate as sanctions in
lieu of the rule of law. Trust has only existed in the
limited private sphere, not in the public domain.
Drawing on work as a development consultant to a
European Union (EU) LIEN/PHARE programme
for integrated economic development in southern
Albania in 1995-97, this article explores how far
economic transition to a liberal and democratic
market economy can succeed when institutions
have not had the opportunity to evolve and absorb
the often difficult, negative effects of transition, and
where minimal social capital inhibits institutional
capacity Section 2 sets out the context of transition
in Albania, in particular in the agricultural sector,
the main activity of the LIEN/PHARE programme
area. Section 3 explores the role of social capital,
the development of trust, and how its presence or
absence affects institutional and economic develop-
ment. Section 4 uses the experience of the project
in southern Albania to illustrate the difficulties for
development projects where social capital has been
absent over a long period. Section 5 concludes that
international agencies concerned with transition
must not only recognise underlying socio-eco-
nomic problems facing countries in transition, but
also work actively with internal groups and
organisations to develop institutional capacity capa-
ble of managing the political, economic and social
problems of transition.
2 Transition in Albania in
practice: agriculture and land
ownership
Albania is placed in the intermediate range of coun-
tries in transition with Bulgaria, Macedonia,
Romania and most of the ex-Soviet countries
(European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD) 1996). These countries have
moved to strengthen product market competition
by liberalising prices and foreign trade, cutting back
sharply on government subsidies and on enterprise
access to soft credits from the banking system. A
high percentage of privatisation of small companies
and shops has occurred. In Albania, by July 1996,
97 out of a total of 400 medium- and large-size
enterprises had been privatised in a mass-voucher
programme. Overall, in 1995 official Albanian sta-
tistics indicated that 75 per cent of Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) and 77 per cent of employment
were in the private sector, mainly in agriculture,
construction, transport, retail trade and the food
industry (EBRD 1996: 136).
Agricultural production unravelled quickly in
1990-91 as a result of spontaneous dismantling of
former cooperatives and the breakdown of the pre-
vious command-economy distribution systems. By
the end of 1993, roughly 92 per cent of land suit-
able for cultivation had been formerly distributed:
450,000 new private farms averaging 1.5 hectares
in size were created. 79 per cent of agricultural land
was distributed into private hands, and of this, 75
per cent went to families (IMF 1994: 6). As a result
of these developments, two years of increased agri-
cultural production, by 14 per cent per annum,
nearly reversed the decline that had occurred in the
previous two years: agriculture's share of Net
Material Product (NMP) increased from 36 per cent
in 1990 to 56 per cent in 1993, as the share of min-
ing and industrial NMP fell from 42 per cent to 14
per cent. However, growth in agricultural output
was constrained by the structure of ownership, with
most arable land occupied by subsistence-orien-
tated small farms. To increase productivity required
improvements in infrastructure, land tenure
reforms and the development of rural credit.
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In 1993 two laws concerned with property restitu-
tion were introduced. Former owners and their
heirs could claim compensation or restitution for
government expropriation of non-agricultural land.
In 1995 two further laws regulating land ownership
and its sale and purchase were passed, transforming
the titles to the usage of agricultural land into prop-
erty titles, and allowing foreign individuals or com-
panies to buy land if they combined the purchase
with three times as large an investment in the usage
of the land.
lt was shortly after this legislation, in November
1995, that the Phare programme for integrated eco-
nomic development began in the coastal region of
Himara in southern Albania, a highly agricultural
area, raising predominantly olives, citrus fruit and
livestock. The project's objectives for agricultural
micro-enterprises and income generation projects
for women working on the land were severely
inhibited by the uncertainty felt by the villagers
with regard to legal ownership and title. This also
had implications for another central theme to pro-
ject development, that of small-scale tourism devel-
opment through renovating traditional stone
houses. It took the tourism development worker
more than six months to ensure the legality of own-
ership of one house, the only one eventually reno-
vated for tourism accommodation by the project.
The project's concern was the incapacity of local
institutions to protect their local environment and
manage their natural resources without adverse
social, economic and environmental impacts from
tourism development.
Legal ownership rights were complicated by several
factors: share and land registries were up to 12
months behind current status; despite the require-
ment for registration, registers did not always exist;
the process of privatisation of land had been agreed
within communities, but in the project area, up to
two thirds of the population had emigrated to
Greece and Italy since 1991, and were thus unable
to defend their rights easily. This delayed clarifica-
tion of ownership. Access to the legal process
demanded help from a patron, usually from the rul-
ing political party; although private parties gener-
ally believed that courts would recognise their legal
rights against other private parties, they did not
believe that courts would enforce such rights if the
state were the other party
3 Trust and social relations
How does the lack of a credible institutional frame-
work and the inability to enforce legal sanctions
hinder the development of trust and economic per-
formance where social capital in Albanian commu-
nities is limited? This section investigates how the
vicious circle of distrust has evolved in southern
and eastern Europe, and how that has impacted on
the ability of those societies to create strong institu-
tions and networks capable of handling difficulties
of transition to a market economy We begin by
explaining some of the key historical determinants
in Albania's economic and political development,
then define what we mean by social capital, and
how trust, or distrust, can evolve or be created.
Historical determinants
Disbelief in the power of the state to protect and
defend Albanians' political and economic rights
emanates from the country history of foreign occu-
pation and domination. Like much of south-eastern
Europe, Albania came under Ottoman domination
from the late 14th century, and remained so until
1912. The nature of Ottoman rule delayed the rise
of Albanian consciousness, and many Albanians
emigrated, especially to southern Italy As the
Ottoman Empire weakened, the Albanian feudal
lords, or beys, increasingly exercised their personal
power, the source of fierce rivalries which plunged
Albania into feudal anarchy Equally detrimental to
Albanian consciousness under Ottoman rule was
the severe restriction of cultural development: the
Albanian language was taught nowhere, nor had a
standard alphabet been devised. Books in Albanian
were virtually non-existent.
Between the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the
coming to power of Enver Hoxha, communist ruler
from 1944-85, Albania came under the influence
and control of various great powers, even when
ostensibly independent. The communist regime's
rigid command economy and autarkic state ensured
there was no experience of the social relations nec-
essary to effect a market economy Instead, since the
fall of communism in 1991, Albanians have fallen
back on their own ancient construction of social
relations embodied, not in the laws of the state, but
in the Kanun of Lek Dukajini, a compendium of
customs concerned with family and clan honour,
passed down largely unchanged since the European
Middle Ages and used by the tribal elders to
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regulate the mountains and control the blood feud.
It is a legal code which mediates revenge killings. A
common recent cause has been conflict over the
privatisation of land, where pre-1944 owners took
their land back and evicted villagers who came dur-
ïng the collectivisation. In 1996, it was estimated,
there were 2,000 blood feuds in progress in
Albania, involving as many as 60,000 of Albania 3
million people (Pettifer 1996).
Origins of social capital
'The social capital of a society has been defined in
terms of relationships that are grounded in struc-
tures of voluntary association, norms of reciprocity
and cooperation' (Brown and Ashman 1996:
1470). Putnam (1993) has argued that high social
capital is to be found in association with co-opera-
tive problem-solving, effective government and
rapid economic development. His theory derives
from research evidence that communities charac-
tensed by strong civic traditions have a greater
capacity to make voluntary cooperation the key to
institutional and, ultimately, economic perfor-
mance. Brown and Ashman (1996: 1471) argue
that the existence of dense networks of active local
organisations indicate high levels of social capital.
In south-eastern Europe, foreign occupation and
hierarchical organisation in both political and eco-
nomic development meant civic engagement was
stifled, voluntary cooperation did not emerge and
economic development stagnated as feudalism was
perpetuated. Albania history mirrors a descent
through the vicious circle of distrust where the
mafia has been able to enter the vacuum that exists
between the state and society The strength of the
social structure of the mafia lies in the stress on
inclusion in the small group, no co-operation out-
side the the group and no toleration of competition.
Sztompka (1995: 27) in his analysis of Eastern
European economies in transition concludes that
these societies are trapped in a deep syndrome of
distrust. He questions how business is conducted
when there is no trust and what explains the deep
distrust. This is not unique to economies in transi-
tion. Clientelism and corruption have been part of
western economic development and mafias exist in
the West as well as the East. The difference lies in
how western institutions developed to combat dis-
trust, predominantly reflecting the social relations
evolved through trust gained by repeated transac-
tions in the public sphere, a process absent from the
development of many countries now in transition.
Sztompka (1993: 86) distinguishes between two
groups of factors which need to be addressed in the
process of transition: 'the "hard" institutional and
organisational frameworks (of economy, law and
administration) ... and the "soft" intangibles and
imponderables (of interpersonal bonds, loyalties,
values, identifications, networks)'. Without this lat-
ter set of factors, the accumulation of trust is inhib-
ited and economic development is made more
difficult. Where trust is strong, it can substitute for
cumbersome law-enforcement systems. However,
where trust is weak, as in the Albanian case, people
undertake little saving, invest little in skill acquisi-
tion and fail to realise the productivity gains
achieved by effective cooperation.
How can trust be engendered? The debate divides
between two main positions. Putnam's linear
approach (good social relations cause good institu-
tional performance, in turn promoting good eco-
nomic performance) is challenged by Williamson
(1979, 1983, 1993). Putnam has argued that trans-
actions which involve uncertainty about their out-
come require 'transaction-specific investments' of
money, time or energy that cannot be easily trans-
ferred; fearing this, people may be reluctant to
invest in the first place. Williamson's approach
emphasises co-operation imposed by authority,
binding economic actors into strong hierarchical
organisations, rather than co-operation achieved
through trust.
Moore's argument lays an emphasis on the mecha-
nisms of transaction within the market place:
'Market order can be produced incrementally
through the experience of market transactions
themselves' (1994: 824). Cheating in business
transactions does not pay; it may bring an immedi-
ate gain but ruins reputation and hence future busi-
ness. Humphrey and Schmitz (1996: 20) see this
argument as one where 'personal reputation mech-
anisms (process-based trust) [are seeni as reinforc-
ing'. They agree with Moore that this is a powerful
dynamic, but note how difficult this process is in
transition economies where a great rupture has
occurred in the economic order: 'The transition to a
new order is a unique occurrence and in the course
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of that transition many economic acquisitions take
place which are not repeated'. It seems that it pays
the individual to be ruthless: large and lasting gains
can be made in the transformation process. This
returns us to the origins of social capital derived
from relationships grounded in social norms of
mutual reciprocity and co-operation and how such
social relations can be stimulated. In the absence of
these processes of interaction, mechanisms to create
trust are limited.
Having established what our notion of social capital
is, and its role in institutional and economic devel-
opment, the next section uses the recent experience
of Albania in transition to examine whether social
capital does matter to the development of institu-
tions that can successfully manage the process of
transition to a market economy
4 The experience of Southern
Albania in transition
The project
The central aim of the EU LIEN/PHARE programme
for the integrated economic development project in
the communes of Himara and Saranda, in southern
Albania, was to empower disadvantaged groups and
enable local populations to participate equally in
development decisions to create sustainable and
locally integrated development. Underlying this
objective was the need to implement this process
through building institutions, aided by a transfer of
resource management skills to establish a perma-
nent resource base in the region. To implement sus-
tainable economic regeneration and social
integration within two years, the project aimed to:
empower the local people through participatory
community development; transfer key economic
skills in agriculture, horticulture, tourism, finance
and marketing; help create employment opportuni-
ties for the resident population, while trying to
attract migrant workers back to the region; ensure
that local leaders and non-governmental organisa-
tions (NGOs) had skills in public participation and
that the communities had a focus for information,
advice and resources; and to put in place mecha-
nisms which would help develop long-term practi-
cal partnerships within the region, the country and
Europe.
The process
Three Eastern European Partnership (EEP) volun-
teer workers (community development, horticul-
ture, English language teaching) and one paid
worker (tourism) spent the first year of the project
(November 1995 to November 1996) in the region,
working with Albanian counterparts in a process of
transference of skills. The initial transference cen-
tred on the implementation of a participatory rural
appraisal (FRA), which took place in March 1996,
to reveal economic and social preferences of the five
coastal communities (Himara, Qeparo, Qeparo Lart,
Kudhes and Borsh), It had been hoped the PRA
would result in village action plans, often the result
of PRAs done in India or Latin America, where a
sense of community and collectivism is perhaps
greater than in Albania. The FRA process was seen
as a first step in active participation in decision-
making in which 'stakeholders influence and share
control over development initiatives, decisions, and
resources which affect them' (World Bank 1994: 1).
Instead, it became transparent that the villagers did
not trust the FRA. Despite a painstaking prepara-
tory process, ensuring widespread community
access to the process, the very notion of collective
action was anathema to the villagers. Collective
action had meant collectivisation under commu-
nism, where every sphere of economic life was hier-
archically controlled from the centre, to the extent
that the villagers were rationed to the amount of
olive oil (a product they produced), a litre per
month per family The 45 years of physical and
emotional hardship caused by complete economic
and political repression were a severe barrier to any
notion of the community acting together for the
benefit of the whole. Confirming Sztompka diag-
nosis (1993: 90), the reaction to a transition to mar-
ket capitalism was one of the need to accumulate:
by whatever means, illegal if necessary, as rapidly as
possible, but largely through another traditional
pattern in Albania, emigration to Greece and Italy
The community development worker faced contin-
ual resistance and distrust in the projecG aims, par-
ticularly in one village where there was not only an
absence of trust of outsiders, but also between vil-
lagers. This was generally expressed when a collec-
tive economic activity was discussed, which was
often presumed to benefit one part of the commu-
nity and not another. Examples include tourism
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accommodation standards and pricing, where the
individuals' concern was to make as much money
as possible from sudden and short influxes of
tourists. Accusations were made that some individ-
uals benefited from backhand pricing deals. This
not only damaged the chance to gain trust within
the community, through the repetition of a set of
economic transactions concerned with providing
the tourism product, but also negated some of the
fragile trust in developing social relations between
the project and the community Further, the con-
cept that unified standards and pricing would ben-
efit the village's long-term tourism development
through collective proven reliability and quality was
not easily understood. Short-term gain blocked this
perception.
Building up social capital and seeing it transformed
into local institutions which would represent local
people's economic, political and social preferences
was continually handicapped by individual
attempts to 'do your neighbour down' before they
did you down, the reverse of mutual reciprocity and
mutual benefit. Despite these problems, by autumn
1996, post-FRA focus groups had been set up to
focus on short-term objectives with specific out-
puts: rubbish collection and disposal; signposting; a
women's group to focus on health issues; business
organisation for handicrafts; and an environmental
education parents' group centred on the Qeparo
primary school with the aim of establishing a local
NGO with this focus. All activities received assis-
tance from the project, with a payment incentive of
US$10 per day to the individual responsible for
organising and leading the group. All those partici-
pating in the FRA as trainees were paid this daily
sum during the exercise. These groups did function,
in particular the women group which, despite the
departure of the female community development
worker in November 1996, agreed to organise a
local nursery, hired a female teacher, visited the
Vlore handicrafts fair and made contacts for busi-
ness and marketing advice. The nascent local NGO
suffered from control by a person associated with
the ruling political party which had attracted con-
siderable opposition locally following the question-
able democratic process for local elections in
October 1996.
The report on the FRA exercise and its aftermath
(Holland and Plymen 1998) argued that, despite
the severe rupture in the development of civil soci-
ety and economic development caused by the
breakdown in civil order in March 1997, the pro-
gramme results indicated that the process of stimu-
lating social relations within and between
communities, through community and economic
development activities, had created some social
capital which was not negated by the breakdown in
law and order. The UI< team were prohibited from
revisiting the area for reasons of personal safety, but
since September 1997 the Albanian team have been
able to visit the region, finding an unexpected wel-
come from those who had actively participated in
project activities resulting in the beginnings of local
institutional development (the women's and
tourism committees), or from those whom the pro-
ject had sought to empower, such as local mayors
and council members. By early 1998 Aquarius, the
national NGO established through the project, was
seeking funding sources through European partner-
ships to help the communities rebuild local institu-
tions and resume development of their local
economy and civil society
During the troubles, Himara Town Hall was razed
to the ground, a symbol of the anger against a state
unable to protect people's savings from the fraudu-
lent pyramid schemes. As the state had no per-
ceived impartial and legitimate institutions (legal,
financial) to protect the Albanian people from the
corruption of the political process, their reaction of
deep anger was expressed through the traditional
patterns of revenge, articulated against the state by
the destruction of its symbols. It appears that the
mafia quickly moved into the vacuum left by the
collapse of institutions which could no longer
organise and protect. How much damage has been
done to local networks and organisations which did
exist is difficult to assess.
At first, the project's approach of empowerment to
recognise indigenous strengths, stimulate social
relations and build up enough social capital to affect
the villagers' self-determined trajectory for local
economic development appeared to be rejected.
The expectation was that foreign assistance would
do what foreign occupiers did in the past: provide a
modern version of the patronclient relationship
through which access to power residing in the state
would deliver goods, such as the connection and
repair of water supply pipes, an asphalt road and
70
sewage disposal. It took repeated transactions in
project activities for the communities to accept that
the project's role was not to influence directly the
state to provide, but to enable and empower them
to access channels of communication which either
resulted in their resolving problems themselves
through self-reliant means (e.g. making and posi-
tioning their own signposts, cleaning up beaches
and waste dumps, organising an accommodation
directory) or working with the NGO and local
authority to install the sewage system and develop
manuals for tourism and community development.
Despite the descent into the vicious circle of distrust
which engulfed Albania in March 1997, it seems, on
initial observations, that the social capital evolved
in the first year-and-a-half of the project has sur-
vived to be invested in restoration of local institu-
tions and their future development.
5 Conclusion
In research on political institutions and local eco-
nomic development in Greece, Holland (1994) con-
cluded that causality for economic development
can work both from social capital and active local
institutions, but also from a transference of eco-
nomic capital (from the EU Mediterranean
Programme) which was tightly organised with strict
accountability structures, similar to Williamson's
hierarchical bureaucratic organisation. The two can
build on each other. However, this conclusion does
not carry over to Albania, where the level of devel-
opment is considerably lower, while cultural depri-
vation has prohibited modern forms of civic
engagement and stifled social relations. Instead of
trust and networks of civic engagement, history has
produced a vicious circle of distrust, reinforcing a
form of primitive social capital which resided in the
private world of family and clan, not in the net-
works of the market place where risks could be
taken and economic co-operation sought.
Albania's growth in real GDP was the highest of the
countries in transition in 1994 (10.3 per cent) and
1995 (9.5 per cent) (EBRD 1997: 7), but social and
political tensions swept the good economic transi-
tion picture away in the spring of 1997. The level of
institutional development did not represent a level
of trust and social capital which could manage the
rigours and ruptures of an economy in transition.
At this stage we cannot predict the outcome for
institutional development and, therefore, the suc-
cess of a transition to a liberal market economy in
Albania. However, international finance institutions
must go beyond merely recognising underlying
socio-economic and cultural factors as impediments
to economic transition. They must work with inter-
nal and external agencies to understand how demo-
cratic economic transition in Albania can build
equality and democratic accountability, building a
bridge between past social relations and the new
institutions of a market economy These institutions
patently failed to be accountable to the Albanian
people's aspirations from market capitalism in
1997. The harsh lessons learnt may yet result in a
new direction for the vicious circle of distrust,
finally transforming into the virtuous circle of trust.
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